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Abstract 
This paper summarizes some of the key findings of a review conducted of the rural 
financial markets in Asia. Policy makers in the region have actually intervened in these markets 
in the past two decades, first to support the Green Revolution and, more recently, to reduce 
poverty. Massive amounts of subsidy funds have been created to lend to targeted clients. The 
authors argue that the result of these many changes and interventions is a fragile financial system 
in many Asia countries characterized by limited outreach and sustainability. 
Development of Rural Financial Markets in Asia 
I. Introduction 
Rural financial markets in Asia are ill-prepared to meet the challenges of the twenty-first 
century. That is the primary conclusion of our recent study for the Asian Development Bank 
(Meyer and Nagarajan). I Asia's rural financial markets have been buffeted by several major 
forces during the past three decades. Policymakers have actively intervened with attempts to 
meet economic and social objectives, first to support the Green Revolution and, more recently, to 
reduce poverty. Massive amounts of subsidized funds have been supplied for these purposes. 
Specialized agricultural development banks and cooperatives have been created to lend to 
targeted clients when commercial lenders failed to serve them adequately. The transition 
economies have dismantled the planned allocation of resources and struggle to create market-
oriented financial institutions. The market economies have introduced more rural-friendly 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the ADB and the assistance of a large number of 
people in helping us complete the study. The views expressed in it and in this paper are our own and may 
not be shared by the ADB or any of the persons who assisted us. Unless specifically noted, the references 
and sources of data used in this paper are given in that study. 
policies, and both entrepreneurs and financial institutions are learning how to cope with the new 
environment. 
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The result of these many changes and interventions is a fragile financial system in many 
Asian counties characterized by limited outreach and sustainability. Many institutions have 
failed, many have been recapitalized, and many are weak with large nonperforming portfolios. 
Few countries have strong institutions capable of serving large numbers of rural farm and 
nonfarm clients. The poorest members of the rural economy tend to have the most limited access 
to formal financial services. Informal finance continues to be important in spite of efforts to 
undermine it by expanding formal finance. 
A positive feature in some countries, however, is the large amount of experimentation, 
especially by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to break the access barriers faced by the 
poor. These innovations appear to be more promising than the earlier attempts to induce lenders 
to serve small farmers, but disturbing problems are also beginning to emerge among some NGOs. 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight what we learned in conducting this research on 
rural financial markets in low income countries in the region. Except where noted, the source of 
information is our ADB study, which drew on a voluminous literature and some primary data. 
Asia is vast so to narrow the study to manageable proportions, six countries were selected for 
detailed study. They are: Bangladesh, India, the Krygyz Republic, the Peoples Republic of China 
(PRC), Indonesia, and Thailand. Bangladesh was chosen because microfinance organizations 
(MFOs) now play a crucial role in the country. India and the PRC were selected because they 
represent huge countries with a long history of heavy governmental intervention in their financial 
markets. The Krygyz Republic is one of the transition economies that has rapidly implemented 
major economic reforms. In Indonesia and Thailand, market forces have been allowed to play a 
larger role in shaping the financial system. 
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The paper is divided into six sections. Section II describes the approach used in most 
Asian countries to develop rural financial markets. Section III summarizes the findings of the six 
case studies we conducted. Section IV describes the relatively good performance of three Asian 
flagship institutions and Section V summarizes key factors that explain their success. Section VI 
presents the conclusions and implications. 
II. The Asian Approach to Developing Rural Financial Markets 
It is useful to first review the approach Asian countries have taken to develop their rural 
financial markets. The second rural Asian study of the ADB in 1976/77 (ADB, 1978) reviewed 
major developments of the previous decade. Five trends seemed encouraging at the time: 
1. A major expansion in rural banking outlets. Commercial banks in India had opened 5,000 
new branches (largely as a result of bank nationalization). The Bank of Ceylon had set up 400 
rural branches. In the Philippines, the Philippine National Bank had set up 100 branches, and 
over 500 Rural Banks had been established. 
2. Sharp increases in loan disbursements. Commercial bank agricultural lending increased in 
India by a factor of 32 from 1968 to 1974. Rural banks in the Philippines increased lending ten-
fold from 1965 to 197 5. In Sri Lanka, the People's Bank increased lending by a factor of almost 
2.5 times from 1969/70 to 1973/74. 
3. Expanded number of institutions making loans without collateral. Many were lending 100 
percent of the cost of cultivation, and some were making long-term loans. 
4. Special programs had been introduced to increase food production by providing subsidized 
credit and inputs to farmers. The BIMAS project began in Indonesia in 1967, and Masagana 99 
was started in the Philippines following the disastrous 1972 harvests. 
5. Governments encouraged or mandated financial institutions to increase agricultural lending by 
imposing credit quotas, creating credit guarantees, and requiring rural bank branches to be 
opened in exchange for the authorization to open urban branches. 
5 
However, several problems were noted by the authors of the study: 
1. Loan recovery, which had plagued many earlier cooperative credit schemes, continued to be a 
serious problem (and later led to the collapse of both BIMAS and Masagana 99). 
2. Interest rates charged to farmers were usually low and did not reflect the cost of lending. This 
often encouraged large farmers to preempt the scarce supplies. 
3. Medium- and long-term loans were limited, and the volume of agricultural credit actually fell 
in many countries relative to funds allocated to manufacturing. 
Both the 1967/68 and the 1976/77 ADB rural Asia studies were ambivalent in their 
conclusions about agricultural credit. They noted the difficulty of ascertaining if credit 
constraints restricted the demand for fertilizer and new seed varieties. The authors believed that 
the new technology increased demand for operating and investment credit, but warned that small 
farmer credit programs were generally unworkable in terms of actually serving the target group. 
They argued that neither interest nor input subsidies, nor systems to control input use were likely 
to stimulate the use of credit or channel it in the right direction. The rapid expansion of credit 
institutions had either exceeded demand or the capacity of institutions to supply and supervise 
credit. This implied that many institutional issues had not been resolved in spite of the many 
efforts undertaken since World War II to build rural institutions and institutionalize the supply of 
agricultural credit. 
Notwithstanding this ambivalence, policymakers continued to aggressively pursue a 
directed credit approach to agricultural lending during much of the 1970s and 1980s, and even up 
to the present in some countries. The approach has the following nine general characteristics: 
1. Interest rates for loans are subsidized and loans for small farmers are set at especially low 
rates. 
2. The government and donors are the main sources of funds and local savings mobilization is 
largely ignored. 
3. The objective of government policy is to increase the supply of loans made to farmers with 
little attention given to institutional sustainability. 
4. Production packages are created with credit treated as an input like seeds and fertilizer. 
5. Credit is targeted for "productive purposes." Loans for consumption and rural nonfarm 
enterprises are ignored and, in some cases, prohibited. 
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6. Many credit programs target small farmers and employ supervised credit through cooperatives 
as a means to ensure it is used properly. 
7. Cooperatives are often the primary credit channels, while commercial banks and agricultural 
development banks are more important in some countries. 
8. Transaction costs for lenders and borrowers are largely ignored. 
9. Some recent programs have broadened their target groups from small farmers to the rural 
poor. 
III. Lessons from the Case Studies 
The six case studies provided comprehensive data used to derive the conclusions of our 
work. They demonstrate how the general policies described above were specifically applied to 
rural finance in each country. Each study was based on a comprehensive review of literature and 
analysis of primary data with the assistance of local consultants. Only a brief summary of each 
case is presented here. 
A. Thailand 
Thailand has expanded rural finance largely through commercial banks and the 
government-owned Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). The private 
commercial banks were initially encouraged to lend to agriculture through quotas that could be 
met by direct lending or by depositing funds in BAAC. Historically, the banks have tended to 
serve larger farmers and agribusinesses. BAAC has expanded rapidly by making wholesale loans 
to farmer associations and cooperatives that on-lend to farmers, and by making retail loans to 
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farmers in groups and as individuals. Its retail loans go mostly to small and medium sized farms, 
and it is reported to now reach some 80 percent of the country's farmers. This is the most 
significant outreach of any country in the region. BAAC recently received authorization to 
expand lending to nonfarm enterprises in rural areas so this will help diversify its portfolio. It 
began to mobilize savings in an aggressive way only recently and has slowly increased the share 
of savings in its total resources. The BAAC interest rate structure is controlled and loan rates are 
still somewhat subsidized; this negatively affects its sustainability. It administers some 
government programs to assist agriculture but tries to ensure that it is fully compensated for the 
costs. 
The growth in total agricultural credit has been impressive; the ratio of agricultural credit 
to agricultural GDP grew from about 0.06 in 1970 to nearly 0.70 by 1996. As a result, most 
farmers have access to the formal financial system. The agricultural credit system is largely self-
financed, and, compared to other Asian countries, there is relatively little need for special credit 
programs for the poor. Informal sources are still important for savings and loans. 
B. Indonesia 
The Indonesian agricultural credit system was dominated by the integrated BIMAS 
project implemented through Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) from the late 1960s until its collapse 
in the early 1980s. The major reforms then implemented by the unit desa system converted BRI 
into one of the most profitable rural financial institutions in Asia. Millions of clients borrow 
nontargeted loans and it mobilizes savings so successfully that surplus rural savings flow to urban 
areas to finance corporate lending. BRI-UD serves both farm and nonfarm enterprises. It is 
surprising that in spite of the BRI-UD success, other smaller provincial and local financial 
institutions serving rural areas have not copied its market-oriented policies. As a result, they 
have been less successful. Moreover, many highly subsidized poverty-oriented projects have 
been recently created, in response to the economic problems caused by the financial crisis. This 
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is an unwise departure from the drive to create sustainable rural finance and will undermine non-
subsidized financial institutions following a market-oriented approach. 
C. India 
India has massively expanded public and private bank branches and cooperatives in rural 
areas and created specialized Regional Rural Banks to expand outreach to the rural poor, small 
farmers, landless workers, and small entrepreneurs. The government still owns 80 percent of the 
banking industry, and the cooperatives are significantly controlled by the individual states. The 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) is the apex institution 
responsible for agricultural credit policy and refinancing rural lending. The Integrated Rural 
Development Program (IDRP) was created in 1978 to provide subsidized loans and cash 
subsidies to the poor. The loan me las of the 1980s and the loan waiver of 1991 were political 
abuses of the banking sector that damaged credit discipline. As a result, loan recovery is a serious 
problem. Interest rates on loans have been tightly controlled. They were finally largely 
deregulated in 1996, but many financial institutions have been reluctant to use this flexibility. 
Because of low interest rates and poor loan recovery, many institutions are not sustainable. The 
rural financial system has expanded outreach; however, it provides poor quality service and is 
sustained by subsidizes. In spite of (or perhaps because of) heavy government intervention and 
massive resources for directed agricultural credit, the ratio of agricultural credit to agricultural 
GDP increased only marginally from 0.159 in 1982 to 0.195 in 1989, and started to decline 
thereafter. The country has attempted to implement more market-oriented policies in recent 
years, but progress is slow because the historical tradition of directed credit is slow to change. 
D. Bangladesh 
Bangladesh historically attempted to expand rural finance through the banking system. 
The nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) were required to open rural branches in exchange for 
opening more lucrative urban branches. Two agricultural development banks are specifically 
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charged with rural lending. The Bangladesh Bank (central bank) sets quotas for agricultural 
lending and rediscounts rural loans made to targeted borrowers. Unfortunately, today the formal 
:financial system is severely impaired. The NCBs , the agricultural development banks, and even 
many new private commercial banks face huge loan recovery problems, as do the agricultural 
cooperatives. In spite of this poor environment, a surprisingly robust micro finance movement has 
emerged, which includes the specialized Grameen Bank and hundreds of NGOs that lend to the 
poor, many in rural areas. These microlenders have achieved significant breadth (number of 
clients) and depth (poverty level of clients) of outreach, although most are highly dependent on 
subsidies. Fortunately, most have avoided the bad-debt syndrome that plagues the banks. Bank 
and cooperative lending have declined in relative terms, but the combination of bank, 
cooperative, and micro:finance lending amounted to about nine percent of agricultural GDP in 
1993/94, which was slightly higher than the same ratio a decade earlier. There is great 
uncertainty about the future of rural finance. The MFOs are freer than banks to adopt a market-
oriented approach but also fail to fully cover their costs and risks of lending. They remain 
dependent on uncertain government and donor funds for their survival. Regulation of MF Os is 
becoming a serious issue because some are now mobilizing large amounts of deposits. 
E. Peoples Republic of China (PRC) 
The PRC has gone through three phases of :financial reforms since 1979 in an attempt to 
create an efficient rural banking system. Information is incomplete about access to the formal 
finance in rural areas. The rural sector is now served by a state bank, a policy bank, rural credit 
cooperatives (RCCs) and rural credit foundations (RCFs). The :financial system has successfully 
mobilized a large amount of savings from rural households. The RCCs are most important in 
mobilizing rural household savings, and they channel a significant share of them into loans made 
to township and village enterprises (TVEs). The unregulated RCFs emerged in the 1990s in 
response to the unmet demand by households and collectives for :financial services. They are 
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more important in lending to households than to TVEs and collectives. The system is somewhat 
more market-oriented today because lending quotas and interest rate ceilings have been relaxed 
for commercial banks. However, loan recovery is a serious problem so, with high costs and loan 
defaults, there are serious doubts about the sustainability of most rural financial institutions. A 
few specialized microfinance programs have recently been created to serve poor areas, but both 
public and private programs have performed poorly and operate with highly subsidized interest 
rates. 
F. The Kyrgyz Republic 
The Kyrgyz Republic has been more aggressive in implementing market reforms than 
many other central Asian transition economies, but the financial system is highly unstable. The 
banks, including the Promstroi Bank and the ABK-Kyrgyzstan that service rural areas, have 
serious problems with nonperforming loans. Interest rates have been set below the rate of 
inflation and farm loans are subsidized through local government budgets. The Kyrgyz 
Agricultural Finance Corporation and savings and settlement companies have been newly created 
to mobilize savings and provide payment services. There is little information about them or the 
several donor-assisted microfinance schemes that have recently been started in rural areas. The 
entire rural financial system is weak and most institutions lack capacity to make good loans and 
recover them. 
Our case studies, along with other literature about the region, revealed that a surprisingly 
large number of countries have made relatively little progress in the past two decades. 
Subsidizing borrowers continues to be the primary objective and sustainability of financial 
institutions is secondary. Yet there is little conclusive evidence that the subsidies reach the 
intended persons, or that subsidized loans actually have a positive impact on technological 
change and agricultural output. Although there are important exceptions, the primary problems 
today are similar to those observed at the time of the ADB study in the 1970s: 
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1. Interest rates are often too low to cover the costs and risks of agricultural lending. Some 
MFOs have set their rates high enough to cover most costs, but a combination of regulations and 
political pressures have kept many agricultural lenders from raising rates to adequate levels. 
2. Many countries have resisted adopting a market-oriented approach to rural finance. Targeted 
programs, subsidized refinance funds, and restrictions on clientele that can be served still exist 
even though some of the more repressive features of directed credit have been eliminated. 
3. Nonperforming loans are a serious problem. Many rural financial institutions, especially 
several agricultural development banks, are weak and continue to exist only because of 
subsidizes. 
4. Savings mobilization is still relatively neglected in spite of the early successes observed by 
rural cooperatives in Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan. 
5. Policymakers focus largely on the problems of agriculture and overlook the broader demand 
for financial services by the rural nonfarm economy. 
6. Most rural financial institutions are unprepared to make long-term loans and to utilize the 
explosion in new information and communication technologies used in modern banking. 
IV. The Positive Example of Three Flagship Institutions 
Fortunately, the entire Asian rural finance experience is not as bleak as the examples 
above demonstrate. The performance of three Asian institutions has been far better than most 
rural financial institutions in the developing world. They have been intensively studied so there 
is more 
information available about them than other institutions that may also have good performance but 
less is known about them. These flagship institutions are BAAC in Thailand, the BRI unit desa 
system of Bank Rakyat in Indonesia (BRI-UD), and the Grameen Bank (GB) in Bangladesh. 
Recent comparative information about them is presented in Table I with emphasis on the two 
criteria increasingly accepted as the appropriate framework for analysis: outreach and self-
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sustainability (Christen, et al., 1995; Yaron, Benjamin and Piprek, 1997). Outreach refers to the 
degree of market coverage for low-income groups previously without access to formal financial 
services. It includes both the horizontal dimension (breadth of outreach or number of clients 
served) and the vertical dimension (depth or level of poverty of clients). In addition, the types 
and variety of financial services offered are also considered. 
Sustainability refers to the ability of a financial institution to supply financial services on 
a continuous cost-covering basis without external subsidies. Calculation of the Subsidy 
Dependence Index (SDI) has been effectively used to evaluate the degree of subsidization of a 
financial organization (Yaron, 1992). Sustainability is desirable for at least two reasons: first, 
temporary access to loans produces some benefits, but creating a long-term sustainable financial 
relationship is more valuable because it provides opportunities for future benefits. A sustainable 
institution will benefit more clients than one that begins with a flourish but later collapses. 
Second, a sustainable institution is free from budgetary dependency on government and donors 
so borrowers can expect long-term access to services if they repay promptly. This helps the 
institutions grow and protects them from political intrusions. 
Some analysts fear a possible trade-off between microfinance outreach and sustainability 
(e.g. Hulme and Mosley, 1996). Institutions striving for self-sustainability may try to reduce 
costs through making larger sized repeat loans to existing clients rather than serving more new 
poor clients with small loans. Realizing economies of scale through wider outreach may 
contribute to sustainability since per unit lending costs decline as loan volume rises, while 
reaching greater depth of outreach may detract from sustainability if the costs and risks of 
lending are not covered by interest income. These three institutions achieve both dimensions of 
outreach, but sustainability needs to be improved in two of them. 
The three financial institutions have slightly different objectives. BAAC was created in 
1966 with a specific mandate to serve agriculture. BRI-UD was reorganized in 1983/84 
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following the collapse ofBIMAS to serve rural low- and middle- income households and its 
portfolio has been dominated by loans for trading and other nonfarm activities. Grameen started 
as an NGO program in 1976 to serve the poor and became a specialized bank for the poor in 
1983. Almost 90 percent of its current clients are women, and many borrow for farm-related and 
nonfarm activities. 
All three institutions lend to millions of clients, but BAAC is relatively more successful 
as it reaches over 80 percent of the country's farm families. It has a larger loan portfolio and a 
larger average loan size. BAAC also performs well in reaching the poor as seen by the 
comparison of average loan size with the country's GDP per capita. GB largely makes group 
loans, BRI-UD makes only individual loans, and BAAC uses both types of technology. 
Savings mobilization is one performance criterion that sharply differentiates the three. 
The total savings for BAAC and BRI-UD are roughly equal, but the number of savers is much 
larger in BRI-UD. The total savings in BRI-UD far exceed its loan balances, while BAAC and 
GB rely on other sources of funds for a significant share of their total lending. Grameen does not 
actively promote voluntary savings. Sustainability is the second major difference among the 
three. BAAC employs a low interest rate policy. As a result its interest rate spread is the 
smallest and, although highly efficient (3.5 percent operating costs), its profits and return on 
assets are low. It has some loan arrears, especially for loans made to cooperatives and farmer 
associations. It is estimated that it would have to raise the average yield on loans from 11 to 
almost 15 percent to become free of subsidies. The GB has an even more serious problem 
because it would have to raise its nominal interest rate on general loans from 20 to 33 percent to 
be subsidy free. BRI-UD is unique in charging the highest interest rates and earns the highest 
rate spread so it can easily cover its higher operating costs. It was so profitable in 1995 that it 
could have reduced its yield on loan portfolio from 31.6 to 16.3 percent and remained free of 
subsidy. Other things being equal, BAAC would need to charge roughly 15 percent on loans, 
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BRI-UD almost 16 percent, and GB about 33 percent.2 Considering differences in loan sizes, it 
should be expected that BAAC would reach self-sufficiency with lower interest rates, while the 
GB would need to charge the highest rates. 
V. Factors that Determine the Success of Financial Institutions 
Why have these flagship institutions succeeded relatively well when so many Asian 
institutions perform poorly? Why has BRI-UD performed so much better than other rural 
financial institutions in Indonesia, and why has Grameen done so much better than other banks in 
rural Bangladesh? Each case is unique; however, research has revealed that there are systematic 
factors that determine the success of financial institutions. They are presented here under a three-
pronged analytical framework of policy environment, financial infrastructure, and institutional 
development. 
A. Policy Environment 
Although the past urban bias of many economic policies in some Asian countries has 
been reduced, many policy issues that influence the prospects for developing sound rural 
financial markets must be addressed in Asian countries. 
1. Interest Rates. The first problem with interest rates for farm loans is that they are 
controlled in some countries and, in others, financial institutions are reluctant to raise rates even 
when they have been deregulated. Rates must be set high enough so financial institutions earn 
interest spreads that will cover operating costs and losses. They must be positive in real terms to 
stimulate savers to deposit funds for lending, and owners must earn enough profits for a 
reasonable return on capital, for reserves and for reinvestment for future growth. Therefore, 
institutions must be free to price their loans and other services to cover costs and risks. 
2 These values vary from year to year depending on the amount of subsidies received. It would be 
necessary to evaluate carefully loan loss provisions, profits needed for future investment and growth, and 
several other factors before determining optimum interest rates. 
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Countries, such as India and Bangladesh, that control interest rates at low levels for certain 
sectors or groups of clients undermine sustainability. The low interest-rate policies ofBAAC and 
GB are intended to assist borrowers, but they force the institutions to rely on governments and 
donors for continuous subsidies, which introduce uncertainties and the possibility of political 
intervention. BRI-UD determines its rate structure so it can avoid some of these problems. 
The second problem is that market-oriented institutions must compete with subsidized 
institutions. This is becoming a serious problem in Indonesia because the government, the World 
Bank, and the UNDP are pumping subsidized credit into village projects to alleviate the effects of 
the financial crisis. BRI-UD may not be seriously affected but this hurts other rural financial 
institutions. The soft conditions and weak enforcement procedures associated with these special 
projects may undermine the repayment culture as loans are treated as grants. Emergency 
assistance must be channeled through networks other than financial institutions. 
2. Client Selection. Freedom to set interest rates is often linked to freedom in client 
selection. Subsidized credit projects usually carry restrictions about the target group. The more 
narrowly specified the target group (e.g. small rice farmers), the greater is the risk that the lender 
will be forced into a risky, undiversified portfolio. Moreover, the greater the subsidy, the greater 
the potential for political intrusion over credit allocation, as demonstrated in the case of the 
Indian loan melas. The three flagship institutions select their own clients with the exception of 
the special government projects administered by BAAC and restrictions on the nonfarm 
enterprises it can serve. Financial institutions must be able to design and market financial 
services that match the demands of their potential clients. They must avoid targeted programs 
that constrain them to serve a specific group or type of client because this will inhibit portfolio 
diversification as a protection against systemic risks. Clients should self-select themselves to use 
products offered by specific institutions rather than being targeted by a specific program. 
Freedom of choice by client and institution permits developing a banking relationship whereby 
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the clients realize that financial services are offered because they are perceived as valued clients. 
The institutions can choose to market specific products of interest to specific clients. For 
example, Grameen shifted its membership towards women who are better suited than men for 
group lending and weekly meetings, and some MFOs try to avoid losses by requiring clients to 
operate a business for several months before seeking a loan. 
B. Financial Infrastructure 
Perhaps one of the most overlooked aspects of rural financial market success is the status 
of the financial infrastructure needed to support financial intermediation. Infrastructure is 
important because it affects the costs of all financial institutions. 
1. Legal and Regulatory Framework. The three flagship financial institutions have 
advantages compared to nonregulated competitors because they operate under charters that 
permit them to legally mobilize deposits. MFO regulations need to be different from commercial 
banks because of the absence of physical collateral for loans. The regulatory capacity in the three 
countries has been questioned but the safety and soundness of these institutions has thus far been 
assured. The Asian financial and economic crisis revealed that a stronger regulatory framework 
is required for developing strong financial institutions (Kochkar, Loungani, and Stone, 1998). 
An important lesson from Bangladesh is the possibility for MFOs to avoid some 
problems temporarily that affect the commercial banking system, such as complicated legal 
procedures to collect loans. When clients are motivated to repay by peer pressure and demand 
new loans, the legal framework may not be so important. However, problems may develop when 
larger loans are made and more traditional forms of contract enforcement are required. The more 
MFOs act like traditional banks, the more they can expect to face similar problems. 
2. Information Systems. No systematic analysis has been done about information 
systems in these three countries. Grameen has a centralized accounting system that prevented 
problems encountered by other MFOs whose records were swept away in the recent flood. Land 
• 
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titling projects are underway in Thailand that will reduce transactions costs for lenders by making 
it easier and cheaper to access information about the legal status of land offered as collateral. 
Efficient systems to supply information about the indebtedness and repayment history of 
borrowers are required as financial markets become more sophisticated. Lenders need ready 
access to accurate and current information to determine if loan applicants have outstanding loans 
elsewhere. Regulated institutions usually have to provide names of delinquent borrowers so one 
institution knows a borrower's status with another institution, but this information is usually not 
available from nonregulated institutions. Large countries without national identity cards, such as 
India, have a special problem in verifying the identity of clients. 
C. Institutional Development 
The three flagship institutions have benefited by being in countries, with the exception of 
Bangladesh, with a reasonably good policy environment and financial infrastructure. In addition, 
their success today is due to a long and careful process of institutional development. This 
includes the complex interaction between the design of the institution, its management and 
governance, incentive systems, human capital development, and a variety of other factors 
(Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega,1996; Yaron, et al., 1997). 
1. The Design of Products and Services. Financial institutions must design specific 
products and services considering two objectives. The first is expected demand from perspective 
clients considering competing formal and informal sources. The second is the ability to cover 
costs and generate profits, either as single transactions or over the expected life of a relationship 
with a client. For example, financial institutions may not be able to competitively offer very 
small, emergency loans supplied by the informal sector; however, BAAC and GB have 
successfully designed products and technologies for short-term working capital loans without 
formal collateral normally required by banks. 
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These three institutions have used market research, test marketing, and pilot projects to 
test and adapt their products to meet client demands. The case studies describe the efforts of 
BRI-UD and BAAC to develop attractive savings products that contributed to their growth in 
savings. Moreover, unlike most targeted credit projects, these institutions lend for a variety of 
purposes recognizing that clients are usually the best judges of how to use loans. However, they 
are strict in expecting repayment regardless of how the borrowers use the loan proceeds. 
2. Loan Recovery. The difference between success and failure of financial institutions is 
often determined by loan recovery. These three institutions report arrears rates of less than ten 
percent and their actual loss rate is much lower. Repayment rates are determined by several 
factors. First, successful institutions design products that improve the borrowers' ability to repay, 
for example, by making small loans and setting repayment schedules consistent with borrower 
cash flow. The weekly repayment schedule used by the GB means the size of each payment is 
small and provides the opportunity for regular contact with clients. The loss of customers may be 
a sign that products and technologies need to be changed. For example, Grameen and some 
MFOs in Bangladesh have recently experienced high drop-out rates. One explanation is that their 
loan products, repayment schedules, and savings requirements are excessively rigid and need to 
be better adapted to client needs (Wright, 1999). 
Second, institutions increase borrower willingness to repay in two ways. Peer pressure 
among group members may encourage repayment for lenders making joint-liability loans. An 
even more important factor is the positive image of institutions seeking long-term relationships 
with clients, so the expectation of future loans with superior terms and conditions induces good 
repayment. In addition, BRI-UD uses the positive incentive of interest relates as a stimulus for 
on-time payments, while BAAC imposes late payment penalties. 
Timely information about clients is a third factor affecting repayment. All three 
institutions have good internal information systems so loan officers know immediately when 
loans become overdue, and can follow up with clients and arrange for repayment. The open 
weekly Grameen meetings where loan payments and savings deposits are made provide a 
transparent way for clients to immediately know who is not paying and places great social 
pressure on delinquent borrowers. 
3. Management and Governance. Managing large institutions with thousands of staff 
and hundreds of outlets is a huge task in countries with poor communication infrastructure. 
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These three institutions have the reputation of being professionally managed and have 
considerable autonomy in day-to-day operations. The founders of BRI-UD and GB are well 
known for their vision and commitment, and they have instilled these traits in their subordinates. 
The Thai government has consistently chosen good managers for BAAC because good 
management and efficiency rather than political expediency were demanded by the governance 
system. At times, foreign advisors may have protected BRI-UD from political pressures and poor 
decisions. 
4. Staff Incentive Systems. Performance-based incentive systems for management and 
staff are used by most successful institutions. The BRI-UD system was designed as profit and 
loss centers, which provides a framework for performance-based remuneration. Both BRI-UD 
and BAAC use bonus payments to stimulate high levels of staff efficiency. Bonuses are paid 
either on overall institutional performance or the efficiency of the individual employees. Base 
salaries are higher than some equivalent jobs in the public or private sector so employees desire 
to retain their employment. Incentives encourage each loan officer to serve a large number of 
clients and manage a large portfolio. GB operates under more difficult constraints because of the 
personnel policies of the bureaucratic state-owned banks, so group spirit and social commitment 
are used to achieve good staff performance. In the recent flood, Grameen first aided its 
employees so they could later effectively service their clients, and it offered special compensation 
and vacation time for employees working under difficult circumstances. 
• -I 
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5. Human Capital Development. These three institutions use different recruitment and 
hiring policies to obtain high quality employees. BAAC and GB have higher educational 
requirements for potential loan officers, while BRI-UD hires staff with lower education levels 
who know the local environment in which they are assigned. All three use intensive training 
programs to teach specific skills and instill the institutional mission. BAAC currently has an 
ADB technical assistance project to upgrade its operations and staff training since the recent 
authorization to expand lending to new clients in nonfarm enterprises and increasing loan sizes 
for existing farm clients requires more expertise. New staff in BRI-UD and BAAC are assigned 
as trainees or apprentices for evaluation before being hired as regular staff. Loan officers in BRI-
UD earn higher levels of loan approval authority as they gain experience, and the decentralization 
of decisionmaking is possible because of investments in human capital development. 
VI. Conclusions and Implications 
The rural financial markets in most of Asia are poorly prepared to enter the next century. 
Many institutions are weak and survive only because of government and donor funding. They 
lack technical competence to evaluate credit risks, the financial infrastructure is not supportive, 
and governmental policies are often more destructive than supportive. New information and 
communication technologies are revolutionizing financial markets elsewhere, but most Asian 
rural financial institutions are far removed from these innovations. Financial dualism is 
increasing, first, in the gap between rural and urban firms and households and their access to 
financial services. A second dimension of financial dualism is arising which might be called a 
"digital divide" because it separates those using modem computers and communication 
technologies from those that do not. 
While Asian policymakers have busily employed the directed credit approach to 
developing rural financial markets during the last several decades, a new paradigm has emerged 
that employs a more market-oriented approach (Adams, 1998; Egaitsu, 1988). The relative 
.. 
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success of many microfinance programs can be attributed to following elements of this new 
paradigm. By clinging to the old paradigm, rural financial markets in most of Asia have not 
duplicated the successes of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in serving rural areas. Government 
interference has been particularly heavy in South Asia and China, so it is not surprising that 
financial institutions have performed badly in these countries. Where markets have been allowed 
to operate more freely, as in Thailand and Indonesia, performance has been better. 
The three-pronged analytical framework of policy environment, financial infrastructure, 
and institutional development we used in Section V helps pinpoint where important challenges lie 
in Asia. The specific problems vary but improvements are needed in all three areas in most 
countries. For too long, many countries have supported failing institutions, especially 
agricultural development banks, which consume scarce resources and represent unfair 
competition to other institutions that are attempting to expand outreach in a sustainable manner. 
These institutions must either be closed or effectively rehabilitated if the countries are to 
successfully reform rural finance. Donors must deny support to countries that fail to take 
meaningful steps towards reforms. 
Asian countries with weak financial markets will suffer in the worldwide competition for 
markets compared to other developing countries with better rural financial systems. The 
opportunities for rapid improvement, however, exist in Asia. The region has a few flagship 
financial institutions that are already well advanced and can serve as models for other institutions. 
Moreover, several countries have highly trained personnel who could create new financial 
technologies and manage institutions if they were given the opportunity, flexibility, and financial 
support. It is up to the governments in the region to give them this opportunity. The roles of 
government are to create a favorable environment, invest in supportive infrastructure, and build 
institutions. The governments also need to recognize the role that the private sector can play in 
financial markets, and to avoid negative policies that undermine institutional viability, such as 
"' .. 
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trying to solve social problems by channeling subsidized loans through financial institutions. Asia 
has the potential to build strong market-oriented rural financial systems. However, there are 
countries that lack the vision and the will to make the necessary changes. The status quo benefits 
the rural elite but it prejudices the poor. 
Admittedly, there are serious challenges in serving the rural clientele in countries with a 
large rural poor, poor resources, and subject to catastrophes of conflicts and natural disasters. 
Serving agriculture involves more risks and costs than is the case with microfinance, so 
expanding the formal financial frontier (Von Pischke, 199 l) is not simply a matter of mimicking 
microfinance. However, simply following the old paradigm is not going to resolve these difficult 
problems either. Fortunately, the successful flagship institutions are instructive and show the 
possibilities for strong outreach and sustainability when appropriate policies and institituitional 
designs are employed. 
.. " . 
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Table.1: Selected Characteristics and Performance Measures of BAAC, BRl-UD, and the Grameen 
Bank 
Item BAAC BRl-UD GB 
Year established/reorganized 1966 1983/84 1983 
Clientele Farmers, cooperatives, Rural low-and middle- Rural poor 
farmers' associations income households 
Financial services Loans and savings Loans and savings Loans and 
deposits deposits compulsory savings 
Lending technology Group and individual Individual Group 
Approximate number of loans 
outstanding 3.1 million 2.3 million 2.1 million 
Volume of loans outstanding $3.8 billion (non- $1.2 billion $289 million 
cooperative loans)8 
Average outstanding loan $1,285 $567 $142 
Average outstanding loan as 
percentage of GDP per capita 42b 54 64 
Average annual volume of 
savings $2.8 billion $2.6 billion $133 million 
Average annual savings as a 
percent of average annual 
outstanding loans 66.5 199.0 45.6 
Number of savers 4.4 millionc 14.5 million 2.1 million 
Approximate nominal effective 
annual interest rate 8.3to15.5 32.7 20 
Interest rate spread 1995: 4.1 1994: 21.7 1995: 8.0 
Total operating costs as percent 
of annual average outstanding 
loans 1995: 3.5 1994: 13.5 1995: 10.6 
Return on assets 1995: 0.55 1994: 4.8 1995: 0.14 
Percentage of outstanding 
loans in arrears 8.3 6.5 3.6 
Subsidy dependence index 1995: 35.4b 1995: negatived 1996: positivee 
Source: Adapted from Varon, Benjamin, and Piprek (1997) except where noted. 
a: BAAC reported total loans outstanding in 1996 of 8177 billion (about $6.9 billion). 
b: Reported by Muraki, Webster, and Varon (1998). According to their estimates, in 1995 BAAC would have had 
to increase its average yield on loan portfolio from 11.0 to 14.89 percent (i.e., 35.4 percent) to be free of 
subsidies. 
c: Reported by Fitchett (1997). 
d: Charitoneko, Patten, and Varon (1998) reported that the BRI unit desas were so profitable in 1996 that they 
could have reduced their yield on loan portfolio from 31.6 to 16.3 percent and still have remained subsidy 
independent. 
e: Reported by Morduch (1998). According to his calculations, the GB would have to increase its nominal interest 
rate on general loans from 20 to 33 percent to become free of subsidies. 
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